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ESSAY
BROWNFIELDS CLEANUP STANDARDS:
CONSISTENCY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CAN RESULT IN
CLEAN CLEANUPS AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT TOO
Samara F. Swanston*
INTRODUCTION
This article argues that the remediation of brownfields to the
highest possible standards, consistent with the goals and principles
of environmental justice, is attainable. Section I establishes that
existing hazardous substance remedial programs have not been
effective in urban areas. Section II discusses the genesis of the
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Brownfields Remediation movement, its relationship to Superfund
Reauthorization, and discusses attempts at legislative revision.
Section III describes industry's initiative to recruit people of color
in an effort to weaken stringent cleanup standards in brownfields
reform. Section IV argues that legislatively authorized lower
cleanup standards will disproportionately burden communities of
color and fail to adequately compensate landowners whose
property values are affected by these lower standards. Section V
focuses on the myth that cleaning up urban areas is too expensive
and describes innovative technologies that can foster clean
"cleanups" that are far less expensive than "cleanups"
implementing traditional technologies.
Many people, organizations, governmental entities and even
polluting industries claim to be committed to environmental justice
today.' However, in some cases, environmental justice, of which
brownfields remediation is a part, is being perverted by those
unfamiliar with and/or uncommitted to its principles. While
cleaning up and developing urban areas is undoubtedly a laudable
goal, the manner in which it is accomplished will determine
whether it is consistent with the principles of environmental justice
or a perversion of those principles.
In an attempt to achieve this goal, The First People of Color
Environmental Leadership Summit adopted seventeen principles of
environmental justice.2 Principle 1 "affirms the sacredness of
Mother Earth, ecological unity and the interdependence of all
species, and the right to be free from ecological destruction."3
1. See Glen M. Vogel, P.E., An Examination of Two of New
York State's Brownfields Remediation Initiatives: Title V of the 1996
Bond Act and the Voluntary Remediation Program, 17 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 83, 85 (1999) ("[F]ederal, state, and local governments, as well as
private organizations, have recently begun implementing initiatives to
remove obstacles to brownfield redevelopment.").
2. See generally CENTER FOR PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL
OVERSIGHT, THE FIRST PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL
LEADERSHIP SUMMIT, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
(adopted: Oct. 27, 1991) (suggesting that adopting the 17 principles of
environmental justice will assist in rebuilding a sacred and necessary
relationship with Mother Earth, celebrating culture, insuring
environmental justice, and obtaining economic liberation), available at
http://www.cpeo.org/pubs/ejprinc.html [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE].
3. Id. at Principle 1.
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Principle 3 demands the "right to ethical, balanced and responsible
uses of land and renewable resources in the interest of a sustainable
planet for humans and other living things."4 Principle 9 states that
"[e]nvironmental justice protects the right of all victims of
environmental injustice to receive full compensation and
reparations for damages as well as quality health care."5 Principle
10 identifies "[g]overnmental acts of environmental injustice as a
violation of international law, the Universal Declaration On Human
Rights, and the United Nations Convention on Genocide."6
Principle 12 "affirms the need for urban and rural ecological
policies to clean up and rebuild our cities and rural areas in balance
with nature, honoring the cultural integrity of all our communities,
and providing fair access for all to the full range of resources."7
Principle 17 requires a "conscious decision to challenge and re-
prioritize our lifestyles to insure the health of the natural world for
present and future generations."8 Each of these principles is
applicable to brownfields cleanups as they establish that
environmental remediation must protect the earth and living things
from physical and economic damage, now and in the future.9
I. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ACTIVISTS CALL FOR CLEANING-UP
URBAN AREAS
In response to the Love Canal incident, Congress passed the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"). l° CERCLA enacted a
4. Id. at Principle 3.
5. Id. at Principle 9.
6. Id. at Principle 10.
7. Id. at Principle 12.
8. PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at
Principle 17.
9. See generally PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE,
supra note 2.
10. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); see also
Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for
a Disparate Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility
Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 211, 211 (1994) ("For
example, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) largely in response
to the Love Canal incident.").
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contingency plan that prioritized the clean up of hazardous waste
sites.1" The contingency plan in CERCLA prioritizes cleaning up
areas where people are dependent on groundwater for drinking.
Nevertheless, hazardous waste sites and waste disposal activities
disproportionately burden communities of color, particularly in
urban areas. 3 The Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA")
data however, shows that approximately 78% of all Superfund
cleanups occur outside urban areas. 4 New York State's data
mirrors the national statistics, with most Superfund cleanups
occurring outside New York's urban areas." Moreover, cleanups
occurring in communities of color were both slower in
commencement and in completion of the remediation process. 6
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A) (1994) (providing a national
contingency plan that prioritizes the criteria used to determine which site
will be cleaned up first).
12. See id. ("Criteria and priorities under this paragraph shall be
based on relative risk or danger to the public health or welfare or the
environment ... taking into account the potential for contamination of
drinking water supplies .... ").
13. See Samara F. Swanston, An Environmental Justice
Perspective on Superfund Reauthorization, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 556, 566 (1994) ("Superfund Reauthorization has important
environmental justice consequences because communities of color and
poor communities are disproportionately burdened with hazardous waste
sites and Superfund is the law that addresses hazardous waste site
cleanups.").
14. See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection:
The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at
S6 ("The EPA's own data shows that only 18.4 percent of the Superfund
sites are in urban areas, compared to 39.3 percent in the suburbs and 42
percent on rural land.").
15. Compare N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
REGISTRY OF INACTIVE HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE REGISTRY LISTINGS,
VOLUME 2 (2000) (listing only 34 Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal
Sites in Region 2), with N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
REGISTRY OF INACTIVE HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE REGISTRY LISTINGS,
VOLUMES 3, and 9 (2000) (listing 121 Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites in
Region 3, and 162 Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites in Region 9).
16. See generally Rae Zimmerman, Social Equity and
Environmental Risk, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 649, 664 (1993) (finding that
minority communities had fewer remediation plans); Donald E. Lively,
The Diminishing Relevance of Rights: Racial Disparities in the
Distribution of Lead Exposure Risks, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 309,
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Given this reality, Principle 12 of the Principles of Environmental
Justice advocates equal attention to urban areas.'
The small number of state and federal Superfund sites in urban
New York are a testament to government and industry reluctance to
remediate hazardous substance and hazardous waste sites in urban
New York.' While the government's limited involvement in
Superfund remediation of urban areas has never been explained,
environmental inequities are currently being identified. 9 Generally,
industry reluctance to remediate urban Superfund sites occurs
because contributing parties do not want to take responsibility for
cleaning up the environment." Superfund is an effective federal
law that has helped change the disposal behaviors of many
polluting industries, and has forced polluters and their insurance
companies to help clean up the environment.2'
311 (1994) (finding disparities in remediation action, waste site
placement, and cleanup plans).
17. See PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 2,
at Principle 12.
18. See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
REGISTRY OF INACTIVE HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE REGISTRY LIST,
VOLUME 2 (2000).
19. See generally Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classification in
Environmental Equity: How We Manage is How We Measure, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633 (1994) (addressing how race and ethnicity are
defined for the purpose of examining the issue of environmental equity).
20. See Vogel, supra note 1, at 84.
21. See Albert Gore Jr., Fixing Superfund: Why America Needs a
Renewed Commitment to Environmental Remediation, N.J. L.J., Feb. 26,
1996, at Supp. 2 ("[S]uperfund has prevented untold amounts of future
pollution, by encouraging positive changes in corporate behavior.");
Howard A. Learner, Environmental Compliance 'Just Good Business,'
ILL. LEGAL TIMES ROUNDTABLE, Jan. 1992, at 1 (noting that "the
imposition of strict liability and joint liability under Superfind has
probably done more to change corporate behavior in terms of reducing
the use of toxic chemicals and reducing the amount of toxic waste, and
managing them better, than any other law. It has provided the economic
incentive to do so.").
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II. USING BROWNFIELDS AS A VEHICLE IN THE CAMPAIGN TO
WEAKEN SUPERFUND
After approximately a decade of failing to overturn the federal
Superfund law in the courts, many responsible parties, their
counsel, and their insurers began a multi-year campaign to
reauthorize and weaken federal Superfund in Congress.23 The
campaign set out to create cheaper and less protective cleanup
standards, and to make the public pay for an even greater share of
the cleanup costs.24 In this initiative, they enlisted leaders of color,
like Ben Chavis, who, in my opinion, knows little about
environmental law and even less about environmental
remediation. 25 These leaders were largely uninformed about the
environmental remediation process and were persuaded that
governmental unfairness in cleanup standards and liability rules
were the main reasons for the lack of development opportunities in
their communities.26
The main criticisms of the Superfund are that cleanups are both
lengthy and ineffective, or contain cleanup standards that are too
22. See Amy Blaymore, Retroactive Application of Superfund, 12
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 10-20 (1985) (discussing those cases
challenging the constitutionality of Superfund); see, e.g., United States v.
N.E. Pharm. and Chems. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied 484 U.S. 848, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); State of Ohio v. Georgeoff,
562 F. Supp 1300, 1300-01 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
23. See Ron Chepesiuk, The Environmental Lobbying Game:
Who Plays it on Capitol Hill and How, 102 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 640
(1994) (noting that the industrial sector of organizations lobbying in the
environmental policy area are the best funded and staffed groups); see
also Charles de Saillan, In Praise of Superfund, 35 ENV'T 42 (1993)
(stating that most criticisms of the Superfund are made by large industrial
corporations and their insurers); see generally Swanston, supra note 13,
at 566.
24. See Swanston, supra note 13, at 570-71.
25. See Kimberlianne Podlas, A New Sword to Slay the Dragon:
Using New York Law to Combat Environmental Racism, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1283, 1284 (1996) (citing Marianne Lavelle, Did NAACP's Ben
Chavis Switch Sides, or Work to Bring Opponents Together?, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 5, 1994, at Al, criticizing Ben Chavis for working along side
insurance companies and other adversaries of Superfund cleanup).
26. In my personal experience, some environmental leaders of
color advocating for lower cleanup standards know little about
environmental remediation.
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stringent.27 Underlying the criticisms, and not always verbalized, is
concern about the cost of cleaning up contaminated sites.28 In
addition, litigation costs between responsible parties and their
insurers are often cited as a reason Superfund reform is needed. 9
Although the fight continues on Capitol Hill, the plan to weaken
the Superfund through reauthorization has largely failed." The
EPA, meanwhile, has embarked upon a program of regulatory
reform to address the criticisms directed at the program. 31
Having failed to weaken Superfund through the reauthorization
and revision of CERCLA, advocates for responsible parties,
developers, and the regulated community devised a "back-door"
27. See Michael S. Moore, Thinking Outside the Box: A
Negotiated Settlement Agreement for the Remediation of the General
Electric/Housatonic River Site Ensures Environmental Health and
Economic Prosperity for Pittsfield, Massachusetts, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REv. 577, 597 (1999) (stating that the major Superfund criticisms are
the length of time it takes to remediate sites, high remediation costs, and
stringent cleanup standards).
28. See generally Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams?:
Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives,
U. ILL. L. REv. 883, 906-08 (1996) (stating that the uncertainty of
cleanup costs are associated with ambiguous cleanup standards); see also
Lincoln L. Davies, Working Toward a Common Goal? Three Case
Studies of Brownfields Redevelopment in Environmental Justice
Communities, 18 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 285, 292 (1999) (noting that
businesses shy away from brownfields due to fear of cleanup and
remediation costs); Thomas G. Kessler, The Land Recycling and
Environmental Remediation Standards Act: Pennsylvania Tells CERCLA
Enough is Enough, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 161, 170 (1997) ("The no-fault
liability scheme imposed under CERCLA has been the subject of much
debate and the focal point of criticism.").
29. See Daniel W. Simcox, The Future of Europe Lies in Waste:
The Importance of the Proposed Directive on Civil Liability Damage
Caused by Waste to the European Community and its Environmental
Policy, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 543, 599-600 (1995) (citing a 1993
U.S. study that claimed that 90% of all Superfund costs go to lawyers).
30. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental
Restoration Act of 2000, S.2700, 106th Cong. (2000).
31. See generally Bradford C. Mank, The Environmental
Protection Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives:
The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 3-4 (1998)
(describing the EPA's regulatory reform initiative, Project XL).
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approach that would produce cheaper and dirtier cleanups." These
parties decided to name contaminated properties in need of
development "brownfields," which, in effect, blurred the definition
of a Superfund site." If a site has contamination that exceeds state
or federal standards, it should be subject to remediation under the
existing laws of New York State.34 If the site does not have high
contamination levels, there may be no need for regulatory
involvement.35 The distinction is important because we have
existing legislative programs at the state and federal level in New
York to respond to Superfund sites.36 Calling these sites
"brownfields" creates a new category of sites that would be
regulated in accordance with newly proposed and less stringent
laws. 7 The brownfields debate and alleged need for more remedial
legislation did not originate in communities built on or near
Superfund sites.38 The debate began and continues in the offices of
developers, politicians, businessmen, foundation program officers,
and among members of the environmental and real estate bars.3
III. INDUSTRY STRATEGY TO CAPTURE THE NATURAL ENEMIES OF
WEAKENED CLEANUP STANDARDS: COMMUNITIES OF COLOR
To ensure that a strategy of lowering cleanup costs and
weakening liability standards succeeds, industry strategists have
embarked on a campaign intended to capture the support of poor
32. See generally Swanston, supra note 13, at 566 (stating that
effective Superfund provisions should not be reauthorized or altered to
accommodate the desires of influential special interest groups).
33. See id.
34. See Brandford C. Mank, Reforming State Brownfields
Programs to Conform with Title VI, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 116
(2000) ("[S]tates, in most cases, would eventually clean up brownfields
to meet strict residential standards, unless the site qualifies for a
voluntary action program that allows for lower commercial or industrial
standards.").
35. See id.
36. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); see also 40 C.F.R. pt.
300 (1 984); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27 (McKinney 1999).
37. See Mank, supra note 34, at 116.
38. See generally Swanston, supra note 13, at 566.
39. See id.
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communities and communities of color.4" Historically, responsible
parties claimed that it was unconscionable to require them to
perform cleanups at urban sites that were ubiquitiously
contaminated.4' Now these same parties, motivated by self-interest,
are going to communities of color and speaking about all the
wonderful community development opportunities that are being
denied them due to the government's impossibly high cleanup
standards.4" These same parties argue that it is a crime that urban
communities are being deprived of needed economic development
opportunities.43
A Voluntary Cleanup Program that is not statutorily authorized
governs brownfields remediation in New York." Like the federal
government, New York State embarked on a regulatory reform
initiative that allows responsible parties to clean up their sites to a
preferred level that is consistent with anticipated site uses.4"
However, the trouble with New York's regulatory reform is that it
offends New York State law.46 Under New York's regulatory
reform initiative, Voluntary Agreements for brownfields sites may
be obtained at listed state Superfund sites.47 Hence, volunteers can
sign an agreement to clean up the environment regardless of
40. I witnessed industry counsel, consultants and strategists
attempt to gain the support from poor communities and communities of
color by telling these communities that they were denied economic
development due to the Government's stringent cleanup standards.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Michael B. Gerrard, New York State's Brownfields
Programs: More and Less than Meets the Eye, 4 ALB. L. ENVTL.
OUTLOOK 18 (1999) (stating that New York is one of the few states that
does not statutorily regulate voluntary brownfield cleanup programs).
45. See Michael W. Peters, New York's Push Toward a Voluntary
Cleanup Program for Brownfields, 1 N.Y. ENVTL. COMPLIANCE UPDATE
(M. Lee Smith Publishers, LLC, Brentwood, Tenn.), Apr. 1995, at 3, 4.
46. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 375-1.1(b)(2)(i)
(1999) (stating that the goal of New York's Program is restoration to its
original state).
47. See generally N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
IMPROVING OUR ENVIRONMENT, IMPROVING OUR ECONOMY:
REGULATORY REFORM AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSERVATION (July 1994).
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whether the neighbors or New York State have sufficient
information about the site. 8
While New York State's Superfund program has its faults,
calling for "too clean cleanups" is not one of them.49 The major
problem with New York's Superfund program is that it is only
applicable to hazardous waste sites and does not address hazardous
substance sites." By leaving out hazardous substance sites, New
York is creating new "Love Canals" for the future." With approval
from the State Department of Environmental Conservation
("DEC"), only the Real Estate Division of the Attorney General's
Office stands between developers who want to build housing on
sites contaminated with hazardous substances and the unsuspecting
public." Fortunately, at more than one site, the New York Attorney
General's office has stopped the sale of homes built on
contaminated or hazardous substance construction sites, even
though the New York State DEC had signed off on the project and
found no hazardous waste. 3
There is a difference between the need for development and the
need for environmental remediation* Communities of color and
low-income communities certainly need economic development,
48. See id.
49. See generally Swanston, supra note 13, at 570.
50. See Gerrard, supra note 44, at 20 (pointing out that New
York State's Title 13 program is narrower than CERCLA, since Title 13
only applies to "hazardous waste" sites, whereas CERCLA uses the term
"hazardous substances," producing a wider jurisdiction for CERCLA).
51. See generally Hazardous Waste: EPA, Justice Invokes
Emergency Authority, Common Law in Litigation Campaign Against
Dump Sites, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10034 (1980) (describing
the Hooker Chemical Corporation's waste disposal at Love Canal in the
City of Niagara Falls, New York).
52. See, e.g., Harold McNeil, Toxic Waste Prompts Homeowners
to Demand Relocation, BUFF. NEWS, Nov. 17, 1999, at B5 (discussing
the Hickory Woods site in Buffalo, an area where homeowners are
expressing a concern that a toxic waste dump, similar to Love Canal, is
brewing in their backyards. City officials argue that homeowner claims
are greatly exaggerated.).
53. See id. (explaining that at the Hickory Woods site in Buffalo,
a housing development was constructed adjacent to a hazardous waste
site and the local residents were not informed).
54. See Swanston, supra note 13, at 565.
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and in some cases have needed it for fifty or more years." If the
government is committed to supporting economic development in
these communities, it can provide aid directly." Developers and
politicians who want to encourage development in our
communities--in my community--can achieve their goal in many
ways. 7 The government can and does provide tax incentives,
affordable financing for both commercial and industrial
development, lines of credit for other community needs, and low-
interest loans."
Why must economic development depend on our communities
abandoning their right to complete remediation, a right that all
other communities in New York can expect? Why does economic
development have to start with environmental degradation?
Economic development initiatives that begin with lower cleanup
standards benefit wealthy developers and polluters at the expense
of the residents in the respective communities. 9
IV. LEGISLATIVELY AUTHORIZED LOWERED CLEANUP STANDARDS
DISPROPORTIONATELY BURDEN COMMUNITIES OF COLOR
Communities located near sites with legislatively authorized
lower cleanup standards forfeit much of their hard-earned equity in
affected property.6" With lower cleanup standards, developers help
determine a community's potential for growth in the future.61 With
legislatively authorized lower cleanup standards, the preexisting
55. In my community economic development has been needed
for over 50 years.
56. See generally Gerrard, supra note 44, at 21 (discussing a
variety of state-provided financial incentives and financial aid
developments designed to aid brownfields redevelopment in smaller
communities).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See generally Alexander H. Tynberg, Oregon's New Cleanup
Law: Short-term Thinking at the Expense of Long Term Environmental
and Economic Prosperity, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 471 (1997) ("[T]he
new cleanup law seeks short-term economic benefit for industry at the
expense of Oregon's long-term land and water quality, and, thus, long-
term economic prosperity.").
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 45, at 4 (stating that sites only
have to be developed to the extent of their intended use).
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inequities in the Superfund program will be institutionalized.62
Moreover, not every development proposed in communities of
color will succeed, and development sites not fully remediated will
result in environmental problems for the community.63 Thus,
mistakes resulting from lower cleanup standards will be borne by
community residents who live on or near these sites.'
Cleanup standards developed by the government are not the
primary cause of inadequate development in communities of
color.65 A 1997 study commissioned by the EPA and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") shows
that the primary reason for the lack of development in these
communities is the market.66 The market is driven by a number of
factors, and one such factor is racism.67 Developers select sites
based upon perceived economic benefits. 68 For the most part, they
do not see an economic benefit in coming to our communities. Of
course, if we give developers land and empowerment zone money,
they will come. However, developers will not necessarily bring any
local economic benefits to the community.
V. INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND WHY WE CAN HAVE IT ALL
Some argue that the government's stringent cleanup standards
are interfering with the natural development of the real-estate
market and the benefits that flow from capitalism.69 I believe the
62. See Julia A. Solo, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund.
Legal Barriers to Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 BUFF. L.
REV. 285, 310-11 (1995) (stating that industrial development and job
security, may be achieved at the expense of heath and safety standards).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See URBAN INSTITUTE, THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS AND REGULATION ON URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 51 (Aug.
1997) (stating that "developers cited non-environmental factors,
especially market demand, as being 'critical' to the implementation of
completed projects."), available at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/pdf/
hazreg.pdf.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See generally Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownfields to
Save Greenfields: Shifting the Environmental Risk of Acquiring and
Reusing Contaminated Land, 27 CONN. L. REV. 789, 801 (1995)
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opposite is true. Sustainable, environmentally sound and cheap
cleanups are within reach.7" The EPA anticipates that remedial
cleanups using phytoremediation will not only increase, but will
also cost significantly less than traditional alternatives.7" If we
insist on clean and inexpensive cleanups, the phytoremediation
market will promote and develop innovations that will enable
thorough cleanups that are less expensive.72
There are several reasons why phytoremediation promises to be
an effective technology and innovation.73 Phytoremediation uses
plants to clean Up contaminated sites.74 For example, mustard,
spinach, sunflower, prairie grasses, alfalfa, juniper, fescue, rye, oat,
cowpeas, clover, popular, willow, mulberry, cottonwood trees, and
a host of other plants are being used to clean up solvents,
petroleum, mercury, lead, PCP's, PAH's, radioneuclides,
explosives, TCE, and cadmium found in soil and groundwater.75
("[F]lexibility in establishing appropriate levels of clean-up and in
identifying the new user of a Brownfield will raise sensitive
environmental equity issues.").
70. See generally STEVEN A. ROCK & PHILIP G. SAYRE,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PHYTOREMEDIATION OF
HAZARDOUS WASTES: POTENTIAL REGULATORY ACCEPTABILITY (1999)
("The estimated costs of various phytoremediation techniques vary from
10% to 50% of physical, chemical, or thermal techniques."), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ordntmt/ORD/NRMRL/rcb/phytohaz.htm (last
modified Sept. 16, 1999).
71. See id. (stating that compared to phytoremediation costs, the
costs of traditional alternatives to hazardous waste cleanups are more
than double).
72. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM NORDHAUS,
ECONOMICS 77-101 (12th ed., 1985) (providing an overview of supply
and demand economics).
73. See generally EPA, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
PHYTOREMEDIATION (1998), available at http://www.clu-in.org/products
/citguide/phyto2.htm.
74. See id.
75. See EPA, PHYTOREMEDIATION OF WOOD TREATMENT
FACILITY SOILS (1999) (discussing how phytoremediation removes
PCPs, PAHs, chlorinated solvents, insecticides, and nitroaromatic
explosives from contaminated soil), available at http://www.epa.gov
/ORD/NRMRL/rcb/phytwood.htm (last modifed Sept. 16, 1999).; see
also EPA, PHYTOREMEDIATION OF TCE CONTAMINATED SHALLOW
GROUNDWATER (1999) ("Phytoremediation of ground water involves
planting deep-rooted, water-loving vegetation to reduce contaminant
levels in the saturation zone."), available at http:www.epa.gov/
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The auto industry,76 nuclear power industry,77 and even the
military78 are already using phytoremediation as a cheaper solution.
Phytoremediation is even being used to clean up residual
radioactive materials from the Chernobyl site.79
ORD/NRMRL/rcb/phytotce.htm; EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE, BROWNFIELDS SUCCESS STORIES: MUSTARD
PLANTS HELPING TO CLEAN UP SITE (1998) (describing how mustard
plants were used to clean up a site heavily contaminated with lead in just
one year), available at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-
doc/sstrentl .htm; Steven D. Aust & John T. Benson, The Fungus
Among Us: Use of White Rot Fungi to Biodegrade Environmental
Pollutants, 101 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 232 (1993) ("The list of
chemicals white rot fungi are able to degrade includes polyaromatic
hydrocarbons, PCBs and other halogenated aromatics (including dioxins),
some dyes, TNT and other nitro explosives, and toxic chemicals such as
cyanides, azide, carbon tetrachloride and pentachlorophenol.").
76. See, e.g., DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP., DAIMLERCHRYSLER
USES FLOWER POWER TO CLEAN UP CONTAMINATED PLANT SITE 1 (Feb.
28, 2000) (using phytoremediation with sunflowers and mustard plants to
remove lead contamination from the industrial site soil), available at
http://us.media.daimlerchrysler.com/index_e.htm; see also Chevron
Explores Phytoremediation Possibility on Petroleum, 21 HAZARDOUS
WASTE NEWS (Business Publishers, Inc., Silver Spring, Md.), July 5,
1999 (stating that Chevron Research and Technology are studying the
effectiveness of phytoremediation).
77. See Nigel Hawkes, Spinach Becomes Nuclear Plant, LONDON
TIMES, May 23, 1998, at D13 (describing how the spinach plant along
with dwarf sunflowers, sugar beets and indian mustard plants are being
used to cleanup soil contaminated with radioactive waste at the Bradwell
Power Station in Essex).
78. See Phytoremediation, Green Bullets Target Army Soil
Contamination, 21 HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS (Business Publishers, Inc.,
Silver Spring, Md.), Sept. 20, 1999 (stating an arms range is being
cleaned up using phytoremediation at New Jersey's Fort Dix); see also X-
Ray Eyes Reveal Contamination History, 13 WASTE TREATMENT TECH.
NEWS (Business Communications Company, Inc., Norwalk, Conn.), June
1998 (noting that native aquatic plants, such as duckweed, can be used in
phytoremediation to remove contaminants from a nuclear materials
operations).
79. See Using Phytoremediation To Clean Up Chernobyl-
Accident Residual Radioactive Materials, 2000 INNOVATOR'S DIG.
(Merton Allen Associates, Plantation, Fla.), Feb. 22, 2000, at 4.
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Not only is phytoremediation cheaper, it is more environmentally
sustainable."0 Phytoremediation even lowers the air and water
emissions that result from other cleanup options." Finally, the
phytoremediation process is passive and solar driven, is less
expensive than mechanical treatments, and is generally accepted by
the public.82
CONCLUSION
The natural resources of the earth do not only belong to us; they
belong to subsequent generations as well. We can make the
decision to leave nothing for the future, or we can have foresight.
The first principle of environmental justice requires holding
Mother Earth sacred. 3 We do not leave poison in that which we
hold sacred. That is not environmental justice. Recently, a coalition
of religious leaders stated that "[e]nvironmental policy must protect
the poor and powerless first and take economic considerations into
account second." 4 The leaders stated that economic growth should
not "take precedence over the life and physical health of God's
children."85 A principled approach to environmental remediation
80. See Tynberg, supra note 59, at 495 (arguing that remedial
actions should incorporate remedial controls such as bioremediation and
phytoremediation to address the unavoidable eventuality of failure of
engineering controls); see also Emin Endo, Cleanup Plan for Peconic
Under Study: Environmentalists are Opposed to Excavation, NEWSDAY,
Feb. 16, 2000, at A28 ("[T]wo environmental groups say excavating with
heavy equipment would destroy wetlands and further contaminate the
river. Instead, they advocated for use of plants to absorb the pollution
wherever possible.").
81. See JONATHAN CHAPPELL, EPA, PHYTOREMEDIATION OF
TCE USING POPULUS 3 (Aug. 1997) (stating in Table 2 that one of the
advantages of phytoremediation is fewer air and water emissions),
available at http://clu-in.com/photoTCE.htm.
82. See REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGIES DEVELOPMENT FORUM,
WORKSHOP ON PHYTOREMEDIATION OF ORGANIC CONTAMINANTS (Dec.
1996), available at http://www.rtdf.org/public/phyto/minutes/phytomin
.htm.
83. See PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 2,
at Principle 1.
84. See Cheryl Hogue, Economics Should Be Second to People in
Environment Policy, Religious Leaders Say, NAT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA)
(Feb. 7, 1997).
85. See id.
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and brownfield development will never look like an error in
retrospect. We can have economic development and clean cleanups
too. We can have it all, but only if we want it all.
